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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
JOSE F. MONTOYA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
BERTHANA INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, INC., and
ROBERT E. SANDERS and
SHIRLEY M. SANDE'RS,
husband and wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
11113

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
The Appellant will be referred to as plaintiff
and the Respondent Berthana Investment Corporation, Inc. as defendant.
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for wrongful death against
defendant Berthana Investment Corporation, Inc.,
lessor of certain premises, and defendants Robert
E. Sanders and Shirley M. Sanders, husband and
wife, lessees.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court granted defendant Berthana's
Motion for Summary Judgment made pursuant to
1

Rule 56 U.R.C.P. and dismissed plaintiff's complaint as to it (R. 23). Defendants Robert E. Sanders and Shirley M. Sanders remain in the action
and are not involved in this appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks affirmance of the trial court's
ruling.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The general background of the case is set forth
in the plaintiff's "Statement of Facts" at Page 2
through 4 of his Brief. Beginning at page 4 of his
Brief, plaintiff sets forth in paragraphs numbered
A through K his claims. However, since some of
those claims are at variance with the uncontroverted facts as established by affidavits or sworn answer to Interrogatories, which are in the file, some
discussion of the factual background and circumstances of the action is considered necessary.
Under subparagraph "C", (Appellant's Brief,
page 4), it is asserted that Berthana (the lessor)
would allow no alterations of the premises by the
lessee without prior written consent of the lessor.
The actual provision in the lease dealing with this
matter is set forth in Paragraph 11 of the Lease,
which is attached to Defendant's Answer to Interrogatories ( R. 11) , and provides:
"That the said parties of the second part
(lessee Sanders) will not make or permit to
be made any changes or alterations in the
2

building or in the electrical wiring therein
without obtaining the written assent thereto
of the party of the first part (Berthana)."
In subparagraph "H" (Appellant's Brief, page
5), the plaintiff states a legal conclusion as well as
assuming the existence of legal duty on the part of
this defendant, in claiming that Berthana knew that
there was "no proper railing or other protective
device to prevent skaters from falling into or being
pushed against said arm rests which constituted a
risk to skaters using the rink". Similarly in subparagraph '·'I" (Appellant's Brief, page 5), the
plaintiff states: "It (Berthana) knew that Sanders
(lessees) would use said premises for skating purposes before the area could be put in a reasonably
safe condition and that Lessees would not make
such changes." These statements assume that the
premises were unsafe and that defendant Berthana
recognized that they were unsafe by inferring that
changes were to be made in the condition of the
premises. These conclusions should be disregarded.
The Lease contains all the conditions between lessor
and lessee. Paragraph 5 of the Lease provides:
"That said parties of the second part
accept this lease and the premises describ~d
therein in the condition and state of repair
that they are now in, and agree to occupy the
same in a lawful manner and for lawful purposes only; and will at. their own. expens~s
keep the said premises m all particulars m
good condition and state of repair."
3

Subparagraph "J" (Appellant's Brief, page 5),
states: "that both defendants knew, or should have
known, of the hazards in the construction of said
area, when used for skating purposes and of the
possibility of injury to persons skating there, especially to children." These purported allegations of
fact are conclusionary. There are no facts founded
upon affidavit or otherwise which support these
conclusions which are at variance with the terms of
the Lease.
Lastly under subparagraph '"K" (Appellant's
Brief, page 5), the plainti'ff admits that the deceased child was "pushed or fell violently" against
an arm rest of a chair from which he suffered personal injury resulting in his death. The uncontroverted affidavit of Alma Clare states that he saw
the deceased boy pushed hard from behind by an
older girl with whom he was skating, which caused
the deceased boy to go out of control. The complaint
also contains claims against Robert E. Sanders and
Shirley M. Sanders, co-defendant lessees, for negli·
gently and carelessly failing to provide proper supervision and permitting skaters to be exposed to the
hazards from the "speeding, rushing and jostling
of other skaters", and in failing to render necessary
aid to the injured boy.
4

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT BERTHANA INVESTMENT CORPORATION AND kGAINST THE PLAINTIFF.

A. The sole cause of the injury and death of
the child was the act of a third party.
The crux of the plaintiff's claim is that the defendant as a lessor knew or should have known, that
the premises were so negligently and imperfectly
constructed as to be unsafe because of arm rests on
seats located on an elevated platform adjacent to
the skating and dancing area. The plaintiff charges
this defendant with knowledge that there was "the
possibility of injury to persons skating there",
(Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, R. 15, Paragraph
4), and asserts that Berthana should be held responsible even though the plaintiff was pushed into
the arm rest by a playmate over whom this defendant had no control or right of control.
After examining the pleadings, affidavits and
answers in interrogatories, the trial court concluded that a cause of action against Berthana did not
exist ( R. 23).
"The primary purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the allegations of the
pleadings", and show that although issues may have
been raised in the pleadings, there is no genuine
5

issue of material fact. Where uncontroverted facts
exist through affidavits or other verified pleadings,
the mere reliance upon an amended complaint is
insufficient because the pleadings when challenged
by proof are not sufficient to raise an issue of fact.
Dupler vs. Yates, 10 U.2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 ( 1960).
It is clear from the affidavits on file that the

cause of the injury was not a defective structure,
but the independent act of a third person. A sworn
affidavit of an eye witness, Alma Clare, states that
he observed a little Mexican girl, with whom the
deceased was skating, "reach out and push the boy
forward into the arm rest ... he was pushed hard
and out of control when he hit the chair ... This
was the first I had seen of any 'horse play' between
the two children or anyone else skating on the floor."
The roller rink was not crowded at the time (R. 12).
This version of the accident is not controverted, but is in fact supported by plaintiff's own statement in his answer to an interrogatory (R. 9). He
states:
"The deceased son and other children
were playing with each other as they ska~ed
back and forth on the floor and that durmg
this procedure it appears that one Miss Aparicio of 1543-27th Street, Ogden, Utah, and
maybe some others, collided with him so~1e
way and he fell against one of the protruding
ann rests of the bench, and as a result, he
died from the injuries."
6

The defendant Berthana had no right under
the lease to supervise the patrons of the rink. The
lease provided in part as follows:
"5. The said parties of the second part
accept this lease and the premises described
therein in the condition and state of repair
that they are now in, and agree to occupy the
same in a lawful manner and for lawful purposes only; and will at their own expense keep
the said premises in all particulars in good
condition and state of repair."
"6. That the party of the first part shall
not be liable for any damages for failure to
keep said premises in good repair and shall
not be liable . . . for any damage occasioned
by acts of neglect of cotenants or others, except party of the first."
"9. To allow the party of the first part
or its legal representatives free access to the
premises hereby leased at all reasonable times
for the purpose of examining, inspecting and
exhibiting the same and to make any needed
repairs or alterations of said premises that
the said party of the first part may see fit to
make without unnecessarily interferring with
the operation of business of parties of the
second part; also to allow to have placed upon
said premises at all times during the last sixty
days of this lease, for rent signs, and will not
interfere with the same."
The injury resulted, not from any defect in construction of the building premises, but from the intervening act of a third party. There is sufficient
evidence in the record to sustain the trail court's
ruling on that basis alone.
7

B. Defendant Berthana breached no duty to
plaintiff's decedent.
The general common law rule concerning the
liability of a lessor to patrons of a lessee, is stated
in 2 Harper and James, Law of 'Torts, Sec. 2716:
"The duty of care to make or keep prem.
ises safe - where it exists at all - generally
rests upon the person who has occupancy or
possession of the premises. If premises are
leased, the tenant is generally considered as
entitled to exclusive possession of them, and
therefore, alone liable to visitors for injuries
caused by their dangerous condition or
use ... "
This general rule was followed in Wilson vs.
Woodruff, 65 Utah 118, 235 Pac. 368 (1925),
where the Utah Supreme Court held that a landlord was not liable for injuries sustained by the
lessee due to the collapse of a wall on the premises
where the defective condition was not a latent one
but was open and obvious to the tenant and there
were no circumstances which would otherwise have
misled the tehant. In Reams vs. Taylor, 31 Utah
288, 87 Pac.1089 (1906), atenantwasinjuredby
falling into an uncovered cellar way at an apartment house. In denying recovery against the landlord the court said:
"It will, we think, not be disputed t~at,
in the absence of deceit or misrepresentat~on
by the landlord, the tenant will take the r;sk
of the con di ti on of the premises leased by him,
and, if injured by reason of the unsafe con8

di ti on, especially when open and unconcealed,
as a_ general rule, cannot recover against the
landlord for such injury."
See also Hatzis vs. U. S. Fuel Co., 82 Utah 38, 21
P.2d 862 ( 1933).

It is well established that the duties and liabilities of the landlord to persons on the leased premises by consent of the tenant are the same as those
owed to the tenant himself. Where the tenant has
no redress against the landlord, those on the premises at the tenant's invitation are likewise barred.
See 32 Am. Jur. Sec. 665.
The plaintiff cites language from an annotation appearing in 123 A.L.R. 868.
That annotation refers to seven prior annotations which discuss the legal responsibility of a lessor to patrons who have come to the premises at the
invitation of the lessee for amusement purposes. An
exception to the general rule of caveat emptor with
respect to a landlord's liability with the restriction
hereafter noted, is generally recognized in relation
to those who enter upon the leased premises for purposes of amusement.

"It is generally recognized that the lessor
of the property for public amusement owes to
the public, at least as to latent def eels, ~he
duty of exercising ordinary care to proVIde
against defects in the premises which render
them unsafe for the use intended." 123 A.L.R.
872 (Emphasis Added).
9

An examination of the cases cited in that annotation, and in the prior seven annotations, refers '
to cases where latent defects are present which
result in eventual injury to a patron of a tenant. The
cases cited in the annotation generally refer to latent defects in the structure of the building or device or to its state of repair. Even if a defect were
found to exist in the arm of the chair in the leased
premises in the present case, it was open and obvious, just as the absence of a down-spout was open
and obvious to the tenant in Wilson vs. Woodriiff,
65 Utah 118, 235 Pac. 368 (1925), discussed above,
in which the court sustained a dismissal of the action.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff argues that it is a
jury question as to whether or not the landlord knew,
or should have known, that persons using the floor
for roller skating purposes, might sustain injury if
projected into the arm rest. (Appellant's Brief, page
9). He claims that the absence of a protective railing was a structural defect. However, the absence
of a protective railing, even if it were found to be
a structural defect, was as open and obvious to the
tenant as to anyone else. Even so, under the same
circumstances, it is just as logical to assume that a
landlord could foresee injury to a patron of the lessee resulting from being pushed into a protective
railing as to impose upon him the clairvoyance necessary to anticipate injury as a result of a patron
being pushed into an arm rest. The plaintiff seeks
10

Lo impose a burden upon the lessor which the law
does not recognize.
In any event, the landlord is to be judged by
the test of reasonable foreseeability and not by hindsight. He is entitled to assume that the premises
will be used in a reasonable way for the purposes
anticipated. The lease prohibiting the lessee from
making changes in the "building" did not apply to
furnishings within the building. The use of the chair
was discretionary with the lessee and was exclusively under his control. It did not constitute a structural defect and there is no claim that it was in any
state of disrepair. The arm of the chair was only
coincidentally involved. It may as well have been a
wall, protective railing, another chair, a table or
any other fixture or thing which happened to be
in the path of the boy, who was pushed out of control.
The widely cited Utah case of Larson vs. Calder's Park Company, 54 Utah 325, 332, 343, 180
Pac. 599 (1919), is most helpful. In that case the
defendant leased a building which he had used, and
which he knew was to be used, as a shooting gallery.
It was immediately adjacent to a "well beaten path"
used by patrons visiting the amusement park in
which the shooting gallery was located. There were
wide gaps in the walls and holes were present in the
building through which glancing bullets could pass.
The plaintiff, while walking along the path, during
a visit to the amusement park, was struck in the eye
11

by a glancing bullet and sustained injury. The following discussion is taken from the opinion :
"From the undisputed evidence it is manifest that by using the building which was intended for use as a shooting gallery and which
was leased for that purpose, in the condition it
was in when leased, the projectiles in passing
from the guns would necessarily be deflected
from the target through the openings in the
wall of the building, and would thus probably
come in contact with a person passing the
building along the passage-way and injure
him ... It was the unsafe condition of the
building as leased, however, which would expose the passer-by to danger and not the sole
act of the tenant, for the reason that, if the
tenant used the building at all as a shooting
gallery in the condition in which it was, the
danger would certainly be constantly imminent . . . Here the evidence is that for years
prior to the execution of the lease by appellant the shooting gallery as operated had been
a dangerous nuisance. The appellant must
have known this fact. It also knew of the passage-way or path, and knew that it was used
by patrons of the resort, and that every person using it was in danger from flying bullets
or parts of bullets which often glance from
the targets and, when not imbedded in the
walls, pass through the cracks and holes therein . . . Any man of ordinary intelligence
would know that tenants would probably continue its use as a shooting gallery, and under
the circumstances disclosed by the evidence,
it may be fairly said that a continuance of the
manner in which it had been used was contem12

plated by the parties to the lease." (Emphasis added).
The court continued :
"The weight of authority is to the effect
that if an owner creates a dangerous nuisance
on his land, he cannot avoid liability to a person injured thereby by leasing to another his
land, with the nuisance thereon, especially in
a case where it may be reasonably expected
that the lessee will put the premises to a use
that will continue the nuisance.

*

*

*

"We agree with appellant's counsel that
as a building by itself the so-called shooting
gallery was not a nuisance. As a bare building
it was innocuous. When targets were placed
in position and the other paraphernalia installed, it was still harmless. It did not become
an active and dangerous instrumentality until a gun was placed in the hands of a patron,
and not until he fired the gun. Then the missiles became active agents of danger, and they
were dangerous then because the walls of the
building had not been protected, and because
the holes and cracks were permitted to be in
the walls and because bullets and fragments
of lead which glanced from the targets and
went through openings in the walls were likely to hit and injure an innocent third party.
All of this could have been foreseen by the
appellant at the time the lease was executed."
(Emphasis added).
Our court has defined "dangerous" as ''full of
or attended with danger, risk, hazardous, perilous,
full of risk, etc." Henrie vs. Rockey Mtn. Packing
13

Corp., 113 Utah 415, 418, 196 P.2d 487, 489 (1948).
"Imminent" means '''likely to occur at any moment·
impending." The Random House Dictionary of th~
English Language, The Unabridged Ed., 1966, p.
712. Nuisance is defined in Section 76-43-1, U.C.A.,
1953, as follows:
"Whatever is dangerous to human life
or health, and whatever renders soil, air, water or food impure or unwholesome, are declared to be nuisances ... "
Although this definition is contained in the criminal
code the maintenance of a nuisance can give rise to
a civil action, making the definition applicable to
a civil case. Dahl vs. Utah Oil Ref. Co., 71 Utah 1,
262 ·Pac. 269 ( 1927). However, nuisance is similarly defined in Section 78-38-1, U.C.A., 1953:
"Anything which is injurious to health,
or indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an
obstruction to the free use of property, so as
to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment
of life or property, is a nuisance and the subject of an action. Such action may be brought
by any person whose property is injuriously
affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by a nuisance; and by the judgment the
nuisance may be enjoined or (abated) and
damages may also be recovered."
The basis upon which liability is imposed upon
a landowner for injury to a patron of his lessee is
that the public policy will not permit him to main·
tain a dangerous nuisance, or one that is imminent·
ly dangerous, and escape responsibility by leasing
14

1

the property which contains it. As is apparent from
the Calder's Park decision, the nuisance must be of
such a nature that the landowner knows, or can be
charged with knowledge, of its imminently dangerous condition, when the property is placed to the
use intended. The imminently dangerous condition
of the shooting gallery, considering the fact that the
building which housed it had large cracks and holes
through which the fragments of bullets could escape,
is certainly to be contrasted with a spectator's chair
elevated on a platform above the skating and dancing floor where spectators or patrons might sit in
comfort and safety. There is nothing about the presence or the use of the leased premises, when used
in the manner in which it was intended, which suggests them to be "imminently dangerous'' or even
''dangerous" in any respect. The chair was placed
there for the convenience of patrons. If this furnishing is declared a "dangerous nuisance" creating a
condition which made a danger "constantly imminent", as defined in Calder's Park, it is submitted
that virtually any furnishing or fixture located in
a building to which the public is invited, could readily fall into this category, because in the course of
events accidents occur under circumstances which
cannot be reasonably foreseen. This is especially
true under circumstances where the injury is precipitated by the intervention of a third party. An
automobile is not considered to be a "dangerous nuisance" nor imminently dangerous even though the
15

use of that agency accounts for thousand of deaths
and injuries each year. If the theory of liability of
the plaintiff is carried to its logical extreme by
declaring an innocuous chair a nuisance, there would
seem to be no limit to its extension and any agency
which is involved in accidental injury to another
could be condemned as a "dangerous nuisance" and
the owner charged with responsibiity for the injury
and resulting damage.
The court in Calder's Park recognized the general rule of law as announced in Reams vs. Taylor,
31 Utah 288, 87 Pac. 1089 (1906), that a tenant,
in the absence of deceit or misrepresentation by the
landlord, accepts the risks of the condition of the
premises as he finds them when the alleged unsafe
condition is open and unconcealed. The court recognized in the Calder's Park case that in order for an
exception to that rule to be applicable, that the
condition in the premises not only must be a dangerous nuisance, but the landlord must know of it, or
the circumstances must be such as to charge him
with knowledge that the use of the facility in the
leased condition for the intended purpose, that
"danger would certainly be constantly imminent."
The court appears to be speaking in terms of injury
being the probable result of using the premises, as
opposed to the mere possibility of injury. It is submitted that none of the conditions necessary to impose liability upon a landlord for injury to a patron
16

of a lessee, as outlined in Calder's Park case, are
present in the one at bar.
The case of Barrett vs. Lake Ontario Beach Co.,
66 N.E. 969 (N.Y. 1903) cited by appellant is similar to the Calder's Park case. There the landlord
leased a water toboggan slide in connection with a
swimming facility. The patron would slide down a
chute into the lake on a toboggan from a platform
approximately 25 feet above the ground. The structure was made in such a way that water would accumulate on the platform and the steps. The only
protective railing on the platform was 21" high. The
landlord was held liable for injury to a patron who
slipped on the wet surface and fell from the platform. The nature of the activity as in the Utah case
was surrounded with risk.
In the Gibson vs. Shelby County Fair case, 44
N.W. 2d 362, 364 (Iowa 1950), also cited by appellant, a 17 year old boy was injured while watching
a hotrod race. He was standing near the race track
where patrons were invited to be when he was struck
by a wheel which became detached from a racing
car. The track was under lease for the purpose of
racing but was designed for harness racing. The
only protective barrier was a delapidated web wire
fence, which was satisfactory for horse racing but
was wholly inadequate to prevent injury, which
could have been reasonably foreseen, from racing
17

automobiles. The court held the exception was applicable:
"When pre:nises are leased for a public
use the owner is charged with liability if a
~emI:>er: o~ the public, rightfully on the premises, is mJured because of a defective or dangerous condi ti on that was known to the lessor
or by reasonable inspection might have been
known at the time of leasing." (Citing Larson vs. Calder's Park Co., case, 54 Utah 325,
180 Pac. 599).

*

*

*

"'The word "defective' in the rule means
construction that is unfit for the leased use,
as well as a state of disrepair."
The case dealt with a defective structure as
determined in light of the hazards contemplated in
the activity to be carried on in the leased premises.
The track was built for harness racing. There is
certainly a substantially greater risk involved to
patrons watching hotrod racing from the unprotected sidelines, than when watching harness races from
the same position. In that case, as in the Calder's
Park case, upon which the court relied, the patron
was injured as a direct result of being unprotected
from the hazards necessarily involved in the contem·
plated activity of the lessee, and not as a result of
an act of a fellow patron as in the case at bar.
In Hamilton vs. Union Oil Company, 339 P.2d
440 (Ore., 1959), the plaintiff sued the lessor company and the lessee for injury resulting when she
18
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fell because of claimed defective construction of
steps within the building to which she was invited,
and where she was present for the purpose of paying a bill. The court sustained an involuntary nonsuit against the Union Oil Company, lessor. The
court distinguished that case from Larson vs. Calder's Park Company, 54 Utah 325, 180 Pac. 599
( 1919), in observing:
" 'This is not a case of an incipient nuisance' ... the governing principle is as stated
by Crompton, J., in Grandy vs. Juber, 5 Best
and S. 73, 485, quoted with approval in Lewis
vs. Jakes' Famous Crawfish, 143 Ore. 340,
346, 336 P.2d 352:
'... But to bring liability home to the
owner the nuisance must be one which
is in its very essence and nature a nuisance at the time of the letting and not
merely something which is capable of
being thereafter rendered a nuisance
by the tennant ... '
"Similarly the court said in Whalen vs.
Shivek, 326 Mass. 142, 32 N.E. 2d 393, 32
Am. Jur. 537, Landlord and Tenant, Section
669:
'. . . If the premises can be used by the
tenant in the manner intended by the
landlord, either as shown by the construction of the premises or by the
terms of the lease, or by other evidence,
without becoming a nuisance, the landlord is not liable for the acts or neglect
of the acts of the tenant which creates
the nuisance. If a tenant creates the
nuisance without authority of the land19

lord and after he has entered into occupation as a tenant, the landlord is
not liable'."
The lease indicates that dancing and roller skating could be carried on in the premises. There is no
suggestion from any source, not even in counsel's
argument, that the use of the premises for a rolling
skating rink would create a ''''dangerous nuisance".
The only hazard which was present was that
necessarily incurred by engaging in roller skating.
If there was lack of supervision, such was the sole
responsibility of the lessee.
Similar cases to the one at hand have repeatedly
denied recovery to a patron. See Randall vs. Pioneer
Hotel, 71 Ariz. 10, 222 P.2d 986 (1950), where a
patron fell on a public dance floor, and Maglin vs.
Peoples' City Bank, 141 Pa. Supp. 329, 14 A.2d 827
( 1940), which denied recovery for injury to a patron because of the collapse of a board in the floor
of a public bathhouse. The court also denied application of the Restatement of Torts, Sec. 359 (also
cited by plaintiff) because there were not large
numbers of persons admitted to the bathhouse. In
the present case there was not a large crowd at
the time of the accident (R. 12 Affidavit of Alma
Clare). See also Sand vs. Theriot, 49 S.2d 484 (La.
1950) and Jackson vs. Public Service Co., 86 N.H.
81, 163 A. 504 ( 1932), wherein the right of a patron to recover from the lessor for injuries sustained
while on the premises at the invitation of lessee was
denied.
20
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!

CONCLUSION
We need not look beyond established and long
standing Utah precedent to resolve the issues presented in this case. Reams vs. Taylor, 31 Utah 288,
87 Pac. 1089 ( 1906), announced the rule that in
the absence of deceit or misrepresentation by the
landlord, the tenant accepts the risk of the condition
of the premises, and, if injury results because of an
unsafe condition, especially one which is open and
unconcealed, there can be no recovery against the
landlord. This rule of law was followed in Wilson
vs. Woodruff, 65 Utah 118, 235 Pac. 368 (1925).
Larsen vs. Calder's Park Company, 54 Utah 325,
180 Pac. 599 ( 1919), recognized a limited exception
to the general rule under circumstances where the
landlord "creates a dangerous nuisance" on his land
which has characteristics such that danger is "constantly imminent", and he knows, or is charged with
knowledge, that the nuisance is to be continued by
the lessees and injury to a patron probable the
then liability for injury resulting to a patron of
lessee can be extended to include the lessor. The
opinion seems to imply that the landlord must be
able to reasonably foresee that the contemplated
use would result in probable injury to a innocent
person. Plaintiff suggests thatthere was only a ''possibility" of injury (R. 15, para 4). Since the premises were not such as to constitute a "dangerous nuisance" the rule in Reams & Wilson applies, and any
defect even if the arm chair were considered to be
such, 'was open and obvious. However, there is no
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indication that the arm chair was in any way unsafe. It was located on a platform off the skating
floor. Certainly it did not constitute a "dangerous
nuisance" which could be found to present a "constantly imminent" danger which would result in
probable injury to patrons of the facility.
It is submitted that the pleadings, admissions
and affidavits on file show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact on matters necessary
to determine as a matter of law that plaintiff is not
entitled to recover from the defendant Berthana,
as lessor, because defendant breached no duty to
plantiff's decedent, and secondly, the accident
resulting in the Montoya child's injury and death, as
unfortunate as it was, resulted soley from the act
of another patron.
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